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Abstract
In his dissertation of 1950, Nash based his concept of the solution to a game on the
assumption that “a rational prediction should be unique, that the players should be
able to deduce and make use of it.” We study when such definitive solutions exist for
strategic games with ordinal payoffs. We offer a new, syntactic approach: instead of
reasoning about the specific model of a game, we deduce properties of interest directly
from the description of the game itself. This captures Nash’s deductive assumptions
and helps to bridge a well-known gap between syntactic game descriptions and specific models which could require unwarranted additional epistemic assumptions, e.g.,
common knowledge of a model.
We show that games without Nash equilibria do not have definitive solutions under
any notion of rationality, but each Nash equilibrium can be a definitive solution for an
appropriate refinement of Aumann rationality. With respect to Aumann rationality
itself, games with multiple Nash equilibria cannot have definitive solutions. Some
games with a unique Nash equilibrium have definitive solutions, others don’t, and
the criteria for a definitive solution is provided by the iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies.

1

Introduction

Some classical strategic games have definitive solutions which follow logically from the
game description and plausible principles of knowledge and rationality. Here is a quote
from Nash’s dissertation [17] which raises the issue of a deductive approach to solving
games:
We proceed by investigating the question: what would be a rational prediction
of the behavior to be expected of rational[ly] playing the game in question? By
1

using the principles that a rational prediction should be unique, that the players
should be able to deduce and make use of it, [. . .] one is led to the concept of a
solution [. . .] .
Another quote from [17] explains this issue even further:
[. . .] we need to assume the players know the full structure of the game in order
to be able to deduce the prediction for themselves.
Some game theorists consider the aforementioned assumption, that the player can deduce
the strategies of other players, as rarely met. Perhaps the following quote from Pearce [19]
represents this skepticism fairly:
The rules of a game and its numerical data are seldom sufficient for logical
deduction alone to single out a unique choice of strategy for each player. To do
so one requires either richer information [. . .] or bolder assumptions about how
players choose strategies.
Foundations of Nash’s approach have been widely studied from probabilistic positions,
and it is not feasible to provide a representative survey of the corresponding literature
within the limits of this paper; we mention [8, 10, 19], just to name few. There has also
been a vast body of epistemic logic studies in the foundations of Game Theory, cf. [12, 23]
for some recent surveys.
In this paper, we offer a logical analysis of Nash’s assumption that the player can
deduce the strategies of others. This concept is of the deductive logical character which
is represented by the notion of a definitive solution of a game as a strategy profile s such
that it logically follows from the game description, including the epistemic and rationality
assumptions, that each player plays s. Here “logically follows” can be understood twofold:
as a logical deduction by certain rules from a set of formalized postulates, or as a logical
entailment of the semantic nature on a class of models. Due to the basic soundness and
completeness theorems of logic, these two approaches are theoretically equivalent and it is
up to the user to choose which approach to follow.
Now dominant, the semantic approach can be traced to Aumann’s seminal “Agreeing
to Disagree” paper [7] and the notion of Aumann structures that model both structural
and epistemic sides of games. Though flexible and convenient, this semantical approach
was not quite foundationally satisfactory, first of all due to assumptions that
1. a given model, including possible epistemic states of players, adequately represents
the game, which is normally described syntactically, and
2. the model itself is common knowledge for the players.
As emphatically stressed by Aumann himself (cf. [9]), this created tension between the
syntactic character of the game description and model-theoretic tools of studying games.
2

It does not appear problematic to assume that the rules of the game, let us call them
GAME, in plain English (or an appropriate logical-mathematical formalism), are commonly
known but this yields, generally speaking, neither (1) nor (2), since there can be many
different models for a given game description1 . Moreover, the standard method of producing
a model of a syntactic set Γ, so-called canonical model construction, generally speaking,
offers an infinite model not necessarily equivalent to the desired model M. So, in a general
setting, when we assume GAME and then study a specific model M of GAME, we lose
information: if a property F holds in M, it does not necessary follow from the game
description GAME and could be an artifact of the chosen model M. One way out of
this predicament could be assuming M to be the definition of the game. This, however,
renders the game description implausible. Aumann in [9] writes about this alternative:
Your mother won’t understand if you try to say it semantically.
How serious is this threat of non-categoricity? Many simple epistemic scenarios are
categorical and yield a specific model, e.g., for regular strategic games without additional
semantical constraints2 , the Muddy Children Puzzle, and others, the initial syntactic description is categorical and any model is equivalent (bi-similar) to the intended model.
However, it is easy to offer a slight modification of the Muddy Children scenario which
makes it non-categorical and the notion of the standard model meaningless. So, if we intend to consider games with general epistemic conditions, the categoricity consideration
can become a serious matter.
The assumption about common knowledge of model M does not look plausible either:
epistemic scenarios in plain English can be publicly announced to a group of players which
makes GAME commonly known. However, publicly announcing even a simple Aumann
structure does not seem realistic3 .

2

New format of reasoning about games

We suggest a modification of the format of reasoning about epistemic scenarios and games
which retains the flexibility of the traditional model-theoretic approach and is free of its
aforementioned deficiencies. The usual format of reasoning about games is
1. to assume the set of game rules GAME, including epistemic conditions given syntactically, in plain English or the usual logical-mathematical slang;
2. to pick a specific Aumann structure A that corresponds to GAME, often informally;
3. to tacitly assume ‘common knowledge of A’ and not to bother about its justification
(whereas a straightforward rigorous formalization of common knowledge of A requires
1

This phenomenon is well known to logicians as ‘non-categoricity.’
cf. Section 7.4.
3
This observation does not concern so-called computer knowledge when the programmer can program
specific models to each computer.
2
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tools outside A);
4. to reason about A using (3).
The deficiency of this schema is obvious. Suppose you establish a property F using (4).
Can you claim that F follows from the rules of the game? In general, no. Since A is a model
of GAME, each fact that follows from GAME holds in A, but not the other way around. It
can easily happen that F holds in A, but F does not follow from GAME. So this schema
produces results about a specific model A of GAME with an additional and difficult-tomotivate assumption of the common knowledge of A. Sometimes this schema works fine,
e.g., when A is the only model of GAME (up to truth preserving bi-simulations). However,
such categoricity analysis is not normally performed and it is easy to provide examples
in which categoricity does not hold. If step (1) in this schema is omitted and A itself is
assumed to be the definition of the game, then the categoricity objection becomes void,
but the problem with common knowledge of A persists.
We suggest the following format for studying games:
1. Assume the set of game rules GAME as above and common knowledge of GAME.
This can be arranged in the language of GAME that contains the common knowledge
modality C - we just assume C(P ) for each postulate P of GAME.
2. Logically reason from GAME directly, e.g., to establish that a fact F follows from
the rules of the game. If GAME is categorical, then reasoning in a specific model is
equivalent to logical reasoning in GAME.
3. Use specific models of GAME, if needed, to check the consistency of GAME or to
establish that a certain F does not follow from GAME.
In this schema, both previous objections, possible non-categoricity of GAME, and dubious assumptions about common knowledge of A, are eliminated. The categoricity requirement is replaced by a much lighter condition: soundness of GAME in A, i.e., that
all postulates of GAME hold in A. Common knowledge of A is no longer required and is
replaced by the assumption of common knowledge of GAME. Additional bonuses of this
approach include the possibility of utilizing logical intuition and reasoning from GAME
informally in the logic of knowledge; informal reasoning using the rules of the game is often
quite efficient and produces shorter proofs than rigorous model reasoning4 . Another attractive feature of this approach is greater flexibility in using models A that can be chosen
specifically to be counter-models for F without commitment that A is a full description of
the game.
All logical reasoning in this paper can be made completely formal within a framework of
multi-agent epistemic modal logic although we don’t see sufficient incentive for doing so5 .
4

By the same token, we use rigorous yet informal reasoning to establish the Pythagorean theorem,
though such a proof could be completely formalized and derived in an axiomatic geometry.
5
We continue our analogy with the Pythagorean theorem: one could try to formalize its proof completely
only as a challenge or an exercise. A normal mathematically rigorous proof of it is not formal.

4

We adopt the view that the reader possesses the robust intuition of epistemic reasoning
and that reference to the S5-based principles of knowledge6 and to common knowledge is
sufficient.

3

Content

As a case study, we consider the class of finite strategic games with ordinal payoffs. Since,
for this class of games, the concept of mixed strategies and expected payoff is not wellfounded, we have to consider pure strategies only.
We observe that games without Nash equilibria lack definitive solutions under any
notion of rationality and that each Nash equilibrium can be a definitive solution for an
appropriate refinement of Aumann rationality.
We show that with respect to basic Aumann rationality, all games with two or more
Nash equilibria, and some games with a unique Nash equilibrium, do not have definitive
solutions either.
Perhaps some of these impossibility results do not come as a surprise for an experienced
game theorist. For example, Theorem 3 states that no game with more than one Nash equilibrium under normal epistemic assumptions and Aumann rationality can have a definitive
solution. This corresponds to the intuition that choosing between several Nash equilibria,
in addition to Aumann rationality, in Pearce’s words, “requires either richer information . . .
or bolder assumptions about how players choose strategies.” However, there is a difference
between empirically justified intuition and a rigorous proof. In computer programming,
experts have no illusions that one could build a universal verifier which, for any given program P and input I, automatically decides whether P terminates on I. Turing’s rigorous
proof of this fact, known as the undecidability of the halting problem theorem, provided a
basis for further fruitful studies of computability. If this paper is successful, this could be
a step towards logical studies of consistency and impossibility in Game Theory.
Furthermore, we show that the criteria for Nash’s definitive solution in strategic games
with ordinal payoffs and Aumann rationality is provided not by Nash equilibria, but rather
by iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
This paper is an extended version of technical report [4] of 2010.

4

Logical presentation of strategic games

We consider strategic games with n players 1, 2, . . . , n. A strategy profile
s = (s1 , s2 , . . . , sn )
is a collection of strategies si for players i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each strategy profile s uniquely
determines the outcome in which each move is made according to s. We assume that
6

such as reflexivity and positive and negative introspection
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everyone who knows the game can calculate i’s payoff as determined by s. A strategy
profile s is a Nash equilibrium if, given strategies of the other players, no player can
profitably deviate (cf. [18] for rigorous definitions).
We assume that rules of the game are formally represented in an appropriate logical
language as a set of formulas GAME as follows. Strategy j of player i is formally represented
by a corresponding atomic sentence sji stating that
player i has committed to strategy j.
For profile s = (s1 , s2 , . . . , sn ), its formula representation will be s1 ∧ s2 ∧ . . . ∧ sn which we
will also call s. In this setting,
^
¬(ski ∧ sli )
k6=l

means that player i chooses only one strategy, and
i
s1i ∨ s2i ∨ . . . ∨ sm
i
i
where s1i , s2i , . . . , sm
i is the list of propositions for all strategies for i, reflects the assumption
that one of these strategies has to be played. The fact that a profile s = (s1 , s2 , . . . , sn )
is at least as preferable as s0 = (s01 , s02 , . . . , s0n ) for player i can be represented by a special
preference formula
s ≥i s0

and all these preferences are supposed to be common knowledge.
In principle, GAME may be a (possibly infinite) set of logical formulas with additional
preference relations on strategy profiles, which contains a comprehensive game description
including its epistemic conditions. Note that GAME is not necessarily consistent.
By “logically follows” we mean here a logical deduction denoted as “`.” This notion
is usually understood in logic as formal derivability. Our reasoning will not be completely
formalized (cf. footnotes 4 and 5), but we assume could be if needed.
We use special logical symbols, knowledge operators (cf. [14]) K1 , K2 , . . . , Kn , to
denote knowledge of players 1, 2, . . . , n and assume the standard principles of knowledge,
cf. [14, 18], a.k.a. S5 principles. For example, stating
Ki (slj )
says “i knows that j has chosen her strategy l.”
We will use the “everybody knows” modality E as the abbreviation
EF = K1 F ∧ K2 F ∧ . . . ∧ Kn F.
Common Knowledge of F , CF , reflects a situation in which all propositions
Ki1 Ki2 . . . Kim F
6

hold for any i1 , i2 , . . . , im .
An informal account of Aumann’s notion of rationality can be found in ([8]). Aumann
states that for a rational player i,
there is no strategy that i knows would have yielded him a conditional payoff ...
larger than that which in fact he gets.
Formal accounts of Aumann rationality based on epistemic models known as Aumann
structures can be found in [8, 11] and other sources. Here we will adopt a syntactic
formalization of Aumann rationality for strategic games.
A strategy profile s = (s1 , s2 , . . . , sn ) is deemed possible by player i if for each j 6= i,
¬Ki (¬sj ).
This definition reflects the assumption that players consider all of their strategies possible
whereas some of the other players’ choices could be ruled out as impossible based on the
rules and conditions of the game. Since we allow epistemic constraints in GAMES, the
notion of possibility should be relativized: s is deemed possible by i at s0 if
s0 → “s is deemed possible by i.”
In particular, s is possible for each i at s. Indeed, by laws of logic, Ki (¬sj ) → ¬sj , hence
sj → ¬Ki (¬sj ).
Let (s−i , x) denote the strategy profile obtained from s by replacing si by x. It follows
from definitions that
s is deemed possible by i iff (s−i , x) is deemed possible by i for every strategy x of i.
Definition 1 Let s = (s1 , s2 , . . . , sn ) be a strategy profile. A formula Ri (s) stating that
player i is Aumann-rational at s is, by definition, the natural formalization of the
following: for i’s any strategy x, there is a profile s0 deemed possible by i at s such that
(s0−i , si ) ≥i (s0−i , x).
A formula
R(s) =

^

Ri (s)

i

states that all players i = 1, 2, . . . , n are Aumann-rational at s.
Note that quantified sentences “for any x ...” and “there is a profile s0 ...” are represented
by propositional formulas since there are only finite sets of possible x’s and s’s and there
is no need to invoke quantifiers over strategies or strategy profiles.
Definition 1 formalizes the most basic, Aumann rationality though there are also other,
more elaborate notions of rationality. However, we assume that any notion of rationality
7

should be at least as strong as Aumann rationality on each profile. Technically, if ri (s) is
a formula representing some notion of rationality of i at s, then
ri (s) → Ri (s)
is assumed in the GAME.
In addition to the game rules we consider a solution predicate, a formula Sol(s) that
specifies the conditions under which strategy profile s is considered to be a solution of the
game. Given rationality predicates ri (s), i = 1, 2, . . . , n and
^
r(s) =
ri (s),
(1)
i

the typical cases of Sol(s) are
1. r(s) informally stating that s is a profile at which all players are rational;
2. Er(s) claiming that s is a profile at which players’ rationality is mutually known;
3. Cr(s) stating common knowledge of rationality at s.
We assume that a solution predicate Sol(s) contains condition 1 that all players are rational,
i.e., for each profile s,
GAME ` Sol(s) → r(s).
Solution predicate 3 corresponds to the familiar assumption of common knowledge of
rationality.
The natural characteristic principle for the solution condition is if a profile is played,
then it ought to satisfy the solution constraints:
s → Sol(s).

(2)

which may be more recognizable in its contrapositive form
¬Sol(s) → ¬s,
meaning if s does not satisfy solution constraints, then s is not played.
The familiar epistemic conditions: rationality, mutual knowledge of rationality and
common knowledge of rationality, mean the corresponding conditions on the solution predicate.
Common knowledge of the game is formalized as common knowledge of each principle from GAME:
if F ∈ GAME , then GAME ` CF .
In particular, if GAME is commonly known, then
GAME ` E(GAME).
8

We say that GAME has the common knowledge of the game and rationality property,
CKGR, if GAME is commonly known and the solution predicate Sol(s) contains common
knowledge of rationality
GAME ` Sol (s) → Cr(s)
for rationality predicates r1 (s), r2 (s), . . . , rn (s) associated with the game and r(s) being
their conjunction as in (1).
Definition 2 A profile s is a solution of a game GAME if
GAME ` s.
For a consistent GAME, a solution, if it exists, is unique. The definition reflects the
property that the rules of the game yield a unique strategy for each player.
For example, Prisoner’s Dilemma has a solution, and the Battle of Sexes does not have
a solution in pure strategies on the basis of Aumann rationality only7 .
Definition 3 A strategy profile s is a definitive solution of the game if
GAME ` E(s).
The definition states that the rules of the game yield a unique strategy for each player and
each player knows all these strategies. Each definitive solution is a solution. Hence, the
definitive solution, if it exists, is unique.
Lemma 1 For games with CKGR, each solution is a definitive solution.
Proof. Indeed, since CKGR,
GAME ` E(GAME).
By the rules of the (modal) logic of knowledge, from
GAME ` s,
one could conclude
E(GAME) ` E(s),
hence
GAME ` E(s).
Informally, if the rules of the game yield a solution, and the rules are known to player i in
full, then i knows this solution.
2
7

This obvious observation, technically speaking, follows from Theorem 3.
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If rationality of players is not known, it is easy to provide an example of a solution
which is not definitive. Consider Prisoner’s Dilemma in which players are rational but do
not know about each other’s rationality. By the domination argument, each player plays
‘defect’ but none knows the choice of the other player8 .
As another example on the notion of solution, consider the following War and Peace
dilemma, W&P, introduced in [3].
Imagine two neighboring countries: a big powerful B, and a small S. Each
player can choose to wage war or keep the peace. The best outcome for both
countries is peace. However, if both countries wage war, B wins easily and
S loses everything, which is the second-best outcome for B and the worst for
S. In situation (warB , peaceS ), B loses internationally, which is the second-best
outcome for S. In (peaceB , warS ), B’s government loses national support, which
is the worst outcome for B and the second-worst for S.
The ordinal payoff matrix of this game is then
warS

peaceS

warB

2,0

1,2

peaceB

0,1

3,3 .

There is one Nash equilibrium,
(peaceB , peaceS ).

(3)

Let us assume Aumann rationality and CKGR. We claim that strategy profile (3) is the
definitive solution to W&P. Indeed, S has a dominant strategy peaceS and as a rational
player, has to commit to this strategy. This is known to B, since B knows the game and is
aware of S’s rationality. Therefore, as a rational player, B chooses peaceB . This reasoning
can be carried out by any intelligent player. Hence it follows from the game description
and CKGR that both players know solution (3) which is, therefore, the definitive solution
of W&P.
Here is another game, W&P2, with the same payoff matrix in which players follow
Aumann-Harsanyi rationality9 that rules out Aumann-irrational strategies and then applies
maximin10 to make a choice. We assume that the payoff matrix is mutually known but
players, though Aumann-Harsanyi-rational, are not aware of each other’s rationality. In
W&P2, S chooses peaceS since it is S’s dominant strategy. Since B considers both strategies
for S, warS and peaceS possible11 , both strategies for B, warB and peaceB are Aumannrational. Then B should follow the maximin strategy, hence choosing warB . The resultant
8

If player 1 knows that player 2 defects, then 1 knows that 2 is rational.
which is equivalent to the knowledge-based rationality studied in [3].
10
following Harsanyi’s principle from [16] Sections 6.2 and 6.3, Postulate A1.
11
otherwise, B would know that S is rational.
9

10

strategy profile
(warB , peaceS )

(4)

is a unique solution of this game, but not a definitive solution. Indeed, B does not know
S’s choice peaceS .

5

Formalizing Nash reasoning

Theorem 1 A definitive solution of a game with rational players is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a strategic game GAME with rationality predicates ri (x), i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
and solution predicate Sol (x). Let s = (s1 , s2 , . . . , sn ) be a definitive solution of the game.
We have to show that s is a Nash Equilibrium. Argue informally given GAME. We have
E(s),
and hence for each i, j,
Ki (sj )
and hence for any strategy s0j for j,

Ki (¬s0j ).

Therefore, sj is the only strategy of j which is deemed possible by i.
Suppose s is not a Nash equilibrium, hence for some player i, the choice of strategy si
is less preferable to some other choice x given the other players’ strategies, so
s = (s−i , si ) <i (s−i , x)
for some strategy x of player i. Therefore, we found a player i and a strategy x of i such
that for all possible for i profiles (s−i , si ) <i (s−i , x), i.e., i is not Aumann-rational at s,
i.e., ¬Ri (s).
Since s is the solution of GAME, s should satisfy the solution condition Sol (s) which
yields that all players are rational at s, i.e., r(s). Since r(s) → R(s), all players should be
Aumann-rational at s, R(s); a contradiction12 .
2
The proof of Theorem 1 demonstrates not only that players cannot derive a definitive
solution from the rules of a game that does not have Nash equilibria, but that the mere
existence of such a solution known to all players is incompatible with the rules of the game.
In particular, this yields that no refinement of rationality, as long as it respects Aumann
rationality, can possibly lead to a definitive solution in such a game.
12

Note that a default assumption that GAME is consistent is necessary since for inconsistent games,
vacuously, each profile is a definitive solution.
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Corollary 1 No game with rational players and without Nash equilibria has a definitive
solution under any notion of rationality.
Note that this Theorem requires rationality but not any degree of knowledge of rationality. Roughly speaking, to spot that the solution is not a Nash equilibrium, we don’t need
players with knowledge of others’ rationality: if the solution were not a Nash equilibrium
in i’s coordinate, it would directly contradict i-th player’s rationality.
An analogue of Theorem 1 has been obtained by Aumann and Brandenburger in [10]:
Suppose that each player is rational, knows his own payoff function, and knows the strategy
choices of the others. Then the players’ choices constitute a Nash equilibrium in the game
being played. Theorem 1 differs from that in [10] by several accounts.
• The models of game and knowledge in [10] and this paper are fundamentally different.
For Aumann and Brandenburger, a game is a probability distribution on the set of
strategy profiles (a belief system), and knowledge of F is probability 1 of the event
F . In this paper, we use a logic-based syntactic approach in which knowledge is
represented symbolically by modal operators interpreted as strict, non-probabilistic
knowledge. Since knowledge represented by modal operators is intrinsically linked
to metareasoning (here a logical deduction from the game description, in accordance
with Nash’s aforementioned description of 1950), this logical model of game and
knowledge allows us to make impossibility conclusions that do not appear to be
within the scope of probabilistic methods.
• The notions of rationality in [10] and in this paper are of a quite different nature. In
[10], rationality of i is maximization of i’s expected payoff and is determined by the
underlying belief system, whereas we allow as a rationality predicate any predicate
which is at least as strong as Aumann rationality.
For the rest of the paper, we consider two extreme notions of rationality: the most general
Aumann rationality, and a highly specialized notion of bullet rationality.

6

On stronger notions of rationality

In this section, we show that any Nash equilibrium can be a definitive solution for an
appropriate notion of rationality.
Theorem 2 Given a payoff matrix M and a Nash equilibrium e, not necessarily unique,
there is a notion of rationality such that the corresponding game with CKGR has e as the
definitive solution.
Proof. Let s = (s1 , s2 , . . . , sn ) be an arbitrary strategy profile and e = (e1 , e2 , . . . , en ) a
Nash equilibrium profile. A bullet e-rationality13 is, by definition, a set of predicates
13

The name is analogous to “bullet voting,” in which the voter can vote for multiple candidates but
votes for only one.
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Bie (s) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n that hold at e and do not hold at any other strategy profile:
Bie (e) ∈ GAME and

¬Bie (s) ∈ GAME for any s 6= e.

(5)

Informally, predicate Bie (s) is used as a rationality of i predicate stating that
player i is rational only at profile e.
We define B e (s) as
B e (s) =

^

Bie (s).

i

Consider a strategic game GAME with
• payoff matrix M ;
• bullet rationality Bie (s) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n;
• common knowledge of the game and rationality, CKGR;
• no other constraints except those explicitly mentioned above.
First, we show that GAME is consistent. For this, it suffices to find a model and a node
at which all postulates of GAME hold. Consider the Aumann structure in which epistemic
states are all strategy profiles,
Ω = {s | s is a strategy profile}, s(s) = s,
knowledge partitions are singletons
Ki (s) = {s},
i.e., each profile is common knowledge in itself, standard truth relation ‘ ’
s

sji iff i-th strategy in profile s is j,

and rationality predicates as defined in (5):
ri (s) = Bie (s).
We claim that all assumptions of GAME hold at node e of the game model. All basic
conditions on strategies and payoff preferences hold everywhere in the model. Rationality
conditions (5) holds at e by definition and B e (e) is common knowledge at e. The solution
predicate is, by assumption, CB e (s) and it holds at s = e. Therefore, the solution condition
s → Sol(s) also holds at s = e.

13

It is easy to see that all players are Aumann-rational at e, since for each player, the
possible strategies of others are those from e, and i cannot improve her payoff by changing
her own strategy because e is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, for each profile s,
B e (s) → R(s),
hence B e (s) is a legitimate rationality predicate.
Now we show that
GAME ` e.
Indeed, since for each s 6= e, GAME proves ¬B e (s) and GAME proves ¬CB e (s),
GAME ` ¬Sol(s)
and
GAME ` ¬s.
So, all profiles s different from e have been ruled out. However, GAME assumes that each
player has to choose a strategy: there should be at least one strategy profile chosen:
_
GAME `
s
s

and e is the only remaining candidate,
GAME `

^

¬s.

s6=e

By propositional logic,
GAME ` (

^

¬s) → e,

s6=e

therefore
GAME ` e.
By Lemma 1,
GAME ` E(e),
2

hence e is the definitive solution.

Such “reverse engineered” bullet rationality is a technical notion which we do not offer as
a viable practical notion of rationality. However, bullet rationality represents an epistemic
condition which, when incorporated into the game description, can single out a given Nash
equilibrium as a definitive solution. With a dash of good will, bullet rationality may be
regarded as a theoretical prototype of Pearce’s bolder assumption about how players choose
strategies ([19]) that leads to a definitive solution in a multi-equilibrium situation.
14

Theorem 2 also has a nearby predecessor in [10] where it was stated that for any Nash
equilibrium s, there is a belief system in which each player assigns probability 1 to s.
Theorem 2 conveys basically the same message with “probability 1” replaced by the logical
notion of strict knowledge which has helped to connect this result to Nash’s notion of
definitive solution.

7

Definitive solutions for Aumann rationality

Whereas Nash equilibria provide a general necessary condition for definitive solutions, a
question of sufficient conditions, i.e., when definitive solutions actually exist, merits special
analysis. Since tempering with the notion of rationality can render any Nash equilibrium
a definitive solution, it makes sense to consider the definitive solution problem for a fixed
notion of rationality. For the rest of the paper, we consider games with basic Aumann
rationality.
We first show that under Aumann rationality, a game with two or more Nash equilibria
cannot have a definitive solution.

7.1

Regular form of strategic games

A regular strategic game is a strategic game described by the following (finite) set of
formulas GAME.
a. Conditions on strategy propositions sji stating ‘player i chooses strategy j.’ These
conditions express that each player i chooses one and only one strategy:
j
l
i
(s1i ∨ . . . ∨ sm
i ) and ¬(si ∧ si ) for each j 6= l.
b. A complete description of the preference relation for each player at each outcome.
c. Knowledge of one’s own strategy si → Ki (si )14 .
d. The solution condition s → Sol (s) for each s where solution predicate Sol (s) is the
formula stating common knowledge of Aumann rationality at s, CR(s).
e. Common knowledge of a – d above.
For example, in the regular form of the War and Peace dilemma W&P, we can demonstrate that (peaceB , peaceS ) is a definitive solution. Indeed, it suffices to logically derive
peaceB ∧ peaceS from GAME of W&P and argue that this derivation can be performed by
any player, hence
Ki [peaceB ∧ peaceS ] for each i ∈ {B, S}.
14

This is the standard requirement of “measurability,” cf. [8].
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Here is a derivation of peaceB ∧ peaceS from GAME of W&P (an informal version of this
derivation was presented in Section 4):
1. By (b) and (e), S knows that warS is a strictly dominated strategy for S, hence S
is not rational at all profiles with warS ;
2. by (d), none of these profiles can be a solution, hence ¬warS ;
3. by (a) and 2, peaceS ;
4. by (e), B knows 1 and 2, which makes strategy war S impossible for B;
5. from 4, B is not rational at (war B , peace S ), hence by (d), ¬warB ;
6. therefore (peace B ∧ peaceS ), and, by (e), this conclusion is known to both players.
This example was intended to illustrate that the regular form of strategic games is sufficient
for accommodating the usual epistemic reasoning in games.

7.2

Consistency Lemma

Lemma 2 A regular strategic game GAME is consistent with the knowledge of any of its
Nash equilibria: for each Nash equilibrium e,
GAME + C(e)

(6)

is consistent.
Proof. It suffices to present an Aumann structure M in which, at some node, both GAME
and C(e) hold. As in the proof of Theorem 2, we define M as
Ω = {s | s is a strategy profile}, s(s) = s,
knowledge partitions are singletons
Ki (s) = {s},
the standard truth relation ‘ ’
s

sji iff i-th strategy in profile s is j,

and Aumann rationality predicates Ri (s).
By construction, M is omniscient, i.e., each fact which is true in a state is common
knowledge in this state:
s F yields s CF.
Let e = (e1 , e2 , . . . , en ) be a Nash equilibrium of the game. We claim that
e

GAME ∧ C(e).
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Since model M is omniscient, it suffices to check that
GAME ∧ e.

e
Since e

e holds by definition of ‘

,’ it remains to show that
e

GAME.

We will check conditions (a – e) one by one.
• (a), (b), and (c) hold at each node by definition of ‘

.’

• for (d) it suffices to check that each player is Aumann-rational at e. Player i knows
all strategies of others, ej with j 6= i, and deems any of i’s own strategy x possible.
However, by changing her strategy ei at e, i cannot improve her payoff since e is a
Nash equilibrium.
• (e) holds because model M is omniscient.
2
Alternatively, the consistency lemma (Lemma 2) can be also obtained by applying Proposition 5.4 (B) from [11] which pursues different goals.
The aforementioned result from [10] stating that for any Nash equilibrium e, there is a
belief system in which each player assigns probability 1 to e, may be regarded as a natural
probabilistic version of Lemma 2.
In this paper, we take one more step and draw impossibility conclusions from the
consistency lemma, thus connecting it with Nash’s definitive solutions programme (cf. Section 7.3).
Corollary 2 A regular strategic game is consistent with playing any of its Nash equilibria
e: set GAME + e is consistent.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 6, since C(e) → e in GAME.

7.3

2

No definitive solutions to multi-equilibria regular games

Theorem 3 No regular strategic game with more than one Nash equilibrium can have a
definitive solution.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, i.e., that some Nash equilibrium e is a definitive solution of
GAME
GAME ` e
17

for some regular game that has another Nash equilibrium e0 . By (a), two different profiles
are incompatible, hence
GAME ` ¬e0 ,
which yields that
GAME + e0
is inconsistent. This contradicts Corollary 2.

2

Note that regular strategic games with some additional epistemic constraints can single
out one of multiple Nash equilibria as a definitive solution. For example, take a regular
game presented by GAME and let e be one of its multiple Nash equilibria. Consider a
new game GAME 0 consisting of GAME with an additional condition that e is common
knowledge:
GAME 0 = GAME + C(e).
By Lemma 2, GAME 0 is consistent: it is easy to see that e is its definitive solution.

7.4

Definitive solutions of regular games via IDSDS

In this Section, we observe that definitive solutions of regular strategic games with ordinal payoffs are completely described by the procedure of the Iterated Deletion of Strictly
Dominated Strategies (IDSDS ) rather then a unique Nash equilibrium. IDSDS iteratively
deletes strategies which are strictly dominated by other pure strategies. Let S ∞ denote the
set of strategy profiles which survive IDSDS. By construction, S ∞ 6= ∅.
The role of IDSDS has been well studied (cf. [1, 11, 22]) and Theorem 4 mainly connects
these studies to the definitive solution framework.
Theorem 4 A strategic regular game with Aumann rationality has a definitive solution s
if and only if s is the only strategy profile that survives IDSDS.
Proof. (Sketch). We use the terminology of [11]. By Lemma 1, it suffices to prove the
analogue of this theorem which speaks about “solution s” rather than “definitive solution
s.” Consider two cases.
Case 1. S ∞ contains states with different profiles, say s1 and s2 . Then such a game
does not have a definitive solution. Indeed, by Proposition 5.4 (B) from [11], there are
states ω1 and ω2 corresponding to profiles s1 and s2 such that
ωi

GAME + si for i = 1, 2.

Therefore, GAME + si are consistent for i = 1, 2. Since s1 and s2 are incompatible,
GAME 6` si for i = 1, 2.
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Case 2. S ∞ is a singleton, e.g., S ∞ = {s}. We show that s is then the definitive solution.
By the completeness theorem for the background modal logic of knowledge (normally, a
multi-agent version of S5), it is sufficient to establish that
GAME → s

(7)

holds at each node of each model (e.g., each Aumann structure). By Proposition 5.4 (A)
from [11], for each state ω, if s(ω) 6∈ S ∞ , then the statement of common knowledge of
rationality fails in ω, hence
ω 6 s(ω) → Sol (s(ω))
and
ω6

GAME.

Consider an arbitrary node ω. If s(ω) ∈ S ∞ , then s(ω) = s, hence ω
then, as above, ω 6 GAME. In either case, (7) holds at ω.
Since (7) holds in each model,
GAME ` s,

s. If s(ω) 6∈ S ∞ ,

and, by Lemma 1,
GAME ` E(s),
hence s is the definitive solution of GAME.
Case 2 can also be derived from [1] which shows that players will choose only strategies
that survive the iterated delition of strictly dominated strategies.
2

8

Unique Nash equilibrium does not yield a definitive
solution

Consider the following game


1, 2 1, 0 0, 1






0, 0 0, 2 1, 1
It has a unique Nash equilibrium (1,2), but no definitive solution within the scope of
Aumann rationality, even if the game and rationality are commonly known. Indeed, each
strategy in this game is Aumann-rational and hence cannot be deleted by IDSDS.
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Discussion

We have seen that Nash’s definitive solution paradigm is not at all universal: in many
cases definitive solutions do not exist. For example, a direct count shows that though 75%
of generic regular 2 × 2 games have definitive solutions, the proportion of solvable games
quickly goes to 0 when the size of the game grows (the number of players or the number
of strategies for each player). Even when definitive solutions exist, the notion of a Nash
equilibrium does not provide sufficient criteria for them. In a way, the results of this paper
support Aumann’s views [9]:
• Equilibrium is not the way to look at games. The most basic concept should be: to
maximize your utility given your information.
• The starting point for realization of this concept should be Syntactic epistemic logic.
In a game, one could expect epistemic and rationality conditions to be given, hence a
methodologically correct way would be to consider whether a game has a definitive solution
under given epistemic/rationality conditions.
For future work, one could apply similar methods for analyzing mixed strategies and
settings with belief rather than knowledge conditions.
It makes sense to further explore the role of proof-theoretical methods in epistemic game
theory. One possible avenue, along the lines of Johan van Benthem’s ‘rational dynamics’
programme ([22, 23]), could be to add justifications – in particular, proofs as objects – to
the logical analysis of games. The focus of such research could be to create a unified theory
of reasoning and epistemic actions in the context of games. There is no action without
reasoning for rational agents; reasoning is itself a kind of epistemic action, and takes other
actions as inputs. A meaningful step in this direction was made by Renne in [20] in which
he suggests interpreting proof terms t in the Logic of Proofs (cf. [2]) as strategies, so that
t:A may be read as
t is a winning strategy on A.
In this light, the Logic of Proofs may thus be seen as a logic containing in-language descriptions of winning strategies on its own formulas.
Other major issues in epistemic game theory that the Logic of Proofs could help to
address are awareness and the logical omniscience problem. The standard semantics for
the logics of proofs and justifications, Fitting models [15], is a more expressive dynamic
extension of Fagin-Halpern awareness models [13]; awareness models are Fitting models
corresponding to one fixed proof term [21]. A coherent general treatment of the logical
omniscience problem on the basis of proof complexity has been offered in [5, 6].
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